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JOYCE, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PROBLEM OF
REPRESENTATION; OR WHY JOYCE WROTE
FINNEGANS WAKE
Robert McNutt
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
“Signatures of all things,” says Stephen Dedalus in the opening
lines of the Proteus section of Ulysses, “I
here to read... coloured
signs. Limits of the diaphane ... in bodies.”1 As Stephen walks
along Sandymount strand, having begun his exile from Mulligan’s
tower, he contemplates the central problem for himself as an artist: the
relationship between things and signs, between worldly objects and
their signatures in language. How, Stephen asks, can things mean?
The world, despite its protean appearance, must have a static reality
behind it. Just as colored signs (“snotgreen, bluesilver, rust”) are the
surface qualities of real bodies (presumably sea, sky, and the beach on
which Stephen walks), so must artistic expression be the signature for a
universal reality. One of the central concerns in Joyce’s work is the
shaping of things, as empirical objects, into the signatures of artistic
expression through language, how one can represent the other.
As a parallel way of approaching this theoretical question in
Joyce’s work, I also intend to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.2 I wish to suggest that Wittgenstein and Joyce
explore the same theoretical issues concerning language and the
possibility of representation. The Tractatus “ not concerned with the
meaning of individual signs per se, but rather with how relationships
are stated to hold between objects in the empirical world through the
use of signs.”3 The problem facing Wittgenstein and Joyce—that of
representation—is precisely the same. I am not suggesting that
Wittgenstein and Joyce are part of any one-to-one relationship of causeand-effect influence (despite the fact that the Tractatus and Ulysses were
both published in 1921), but rather that an analysis of the Tractatus can
help historicize the theoretical strategies in Joyce’s work.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is broken into seven sections, each
composed of a series of carefully constructed axioms which build one
upon another. Often the assertions of one section alter or reinterpret
those which came before them (Wittgenstein himself compared the
process to a series of ladders which are to be thrown away once one has
climbed them). The Tractatus begins with the assertion that “The world
is everything that is the case” (1.0), and that it divides into “facts”
which are non-linguistic. Wittgenstein then turns to the “pictures we

Published by eGrove, 1988
is
am

1

Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 6 [1988], Art. 24

Robert McNutt

229

make for ourselves” of the facts—propositions or sentences—and
explores the semantic relationship between facts and propositions.
Wittgenstein holds that meaning is possible only if the proposition a
picture of the facts—a literal model. (This was suggested to him, so
the story goes, by dolls and toy cars used to reconstruct an automobile
accident in a courtroom.) The elements of a proposition, then, have the
same logical form as do facts: the logical form of representation. Just
as toy
and dolls represent the situation of an accident, to understand
the logical form of a proposition is to understand the logical form of
the world: “there must be something identical in a picture and what it
depicts, to enable one to be a picture of the other at all” (2.161). In
order to verify propositions, then, one must look to the world (rather
than, say, a dictionary) because propositions, if true, are pictures of the
facts of
world.
Once Wittgenstein demonstrates the representational relationship
between propositions and facts, he raises the ante and begins to
seriously question whether language can transmit such inquiries. Even
though language can represent the world, it cannot make sense of the
world, for “a picture cannot, however, depict its representational
it displays it” (2.172).
other words, the relationship between
language and the world cannot be put into words, just as the
relationship between an artist and his painting not directly displayed
in the painting itself. Values ad ethics, therefore, cannot be expressed,
for “in it [the world] no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have
no value” (6.41). To make sense of the world one would have to climb
outside the world, which for Wittgenstein illogical and therefore
impossible. He adds that “Here it
be seen that solipsism, when
implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism,” and
philosophical investigations, because they try to be ethical and outside
the world, are senseless. Wittgenstein then concludes the Tractates by
applying this dictum to his won work: "What we cannot speak about
we must pass over in silence” (7.0). Wittgenstein thereafter abandoned
philosophical investigations completely for nine years, and published
but one essay until his death thirty years later.
So to return to Joyce, the problems facing Stephen Dedalus in the
opening of Ulysses are the same problems facing Wittgenstein in the
opening arguments of the Tractatus: the relationship between language
and
world. The young Dedalus in Portrait struggles
a
of crises which involve his own private, artistic relationship between
himself as artist and his world: first his family, then his church, and
finally his country and the question of Irish nationalism. These three
spheres revolve around young Dedalus in a series of hierarchical circles
of language, for it is language and its power to represent things through
signs that continually obsess Stephen and attract him to the rhetoric of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studies_eng_new/vol6/iss1/24
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the pulpit and the political platform. Even as a grammar school student
at Clongowes, Stephen tries to articulate the relationship to his world
through language as he writes in the flyleaf of his geography book:
Stephen Dedalus
Class of Elements
Clongowes Wood College
Sallins
County Kildare
Ireland
Europe
The World
The Universe (Portrait,
14)

Beyond the universe
is also linguistic:

whose relationship to the young schoolboy

God was God’s name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu
was the French for God and that was God’s name too; and
when anyone prayed to God and said Dieu then God knew at
once that it was a French person praying. But though there
were different names for God in all the different languages
in the world and God understood what all the people who
prayed said in the different languages still God remained
always
same and God’s real name was God. (Portrait,
p. 16)

Now aside from the humorous naivete of Stephen’s schoolboy logic,
the essence of is question contains a key Joycean idea: the power of
words o name and make distinctions. In order to understand his world,
to place values on it, Stephen must posit a God outside his world to
give the hierarchy meaning. Words can represent logically and
truthfully the world because language and reality share the same form:
God knows his names among the languages and words are his form.
Stephen in a sense doesn’t struggle with God—he struggles with signs,
names, the instruments of God if you like. But despite the struggle,
notice that Stephen never questions the relationship between signs and
things, only the relationship between signs themselves. The
representational quality of language is still possible; words can still
make sense of the world.
Furthermore, as Stephen matures and faces the oratory of
in Book III of Portrait, it is again the representational power of
language which haunts him. Feeling the pull of the sermons, the
shame of his sins and his need for confession, Stephen again confronts
the nature of signs and their relationship to things. Stephen’s struggle

Published by eGrove, 1988

3

Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 6 [1988], Art. 24

Robert McNutt

231

with the church is a struggle against rhetorical manipulation and the
power of language, for the point of the chapter is not so much that
Stephen “sins,” but rather it focuses on the power of the church in
making Stephen submissive to its orthodoxy, an orthodoxy of words.
Returning from the chapel after a sermon on Hell, for example, Stephen
cries:
Every word for him! It was
God was almighty. God
would call him now ... He had died . . . —Hell! Hell!
Hell! Hell! Hell! (Portrait,
125)

It is the cadence of the words that terrifies; Stephen’s torment lies in
signs, not things.
Stephen’s predicament is similar to a series of propositions from
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:
Objects make up the substance of the world, That is why
they cannot be composite (2.021).
If the world had no substance, then whether
proposition had sense would depend upon whether another
proposition was true (2.0211).
In that case we could not sketch out any picture, of the
world
or false) (2.0211).
It is obvious
an imagined world, however different it
may be from the real one, must have something—a form—
in common with it (2.022).
What picture, of whatever form, must have in common
with reality, in order to depict it—correctly or
incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the
form of reality (2.18).

Wittgenstein at this point in the Tractatus shares the same views
young Dedalus: pictures of the world (in Stephen’s case God and
share the same logical form as the world itself. Stephen’s torment lies
in his choice of pictures which represent the world, with signs not
And strongly implied in Stephen’s awareness of his sin is the a
priori notion that words can logically and
represent the world.
Conversely, if words can imprison Stephen through their
representation of the world, they can also set
free: confess and say
it with words. Confession his release:
Blinded by his tears and by the light of God’s
mercifulness he bent his head and heard the grave words of
absolution spoken and saw the priest’s hand raised above
him in forgiveness . . .
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He had confessed and God had pardoned him. His soul
was made fair and holy once more, holy and happy
(Portrait, p. 143).

So in Book V of Portrait, when Stephen spells out his aesthetic
theory, it comes as no surprise that the artist, “like the God of creation,
remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, indifferent,
paring his fingernails” (Portrait, p. 215). Like
God on the flyleaf of
his geography book, Stephen’s artist steps outside the world to make
sense of it; and like the concentric circles on that same flyleaf, Stephen
constructs a hierarchy of meaning which moves from objects to the
stasis of essential beauty. Beauty, Stephen tells Lynch, is
aesthetic
universal, independent of specific objects:
Though the same object may not seem beautiful to all
people, all people who admire beautiful objects find in
them certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the
stages themselves of aesthetic apprehension (Portrait,
p. 209).

So Stephen’s aesthetics depend upon the representational quality of
language—objects, after all, have to depict beautiful forms before he
can extract their essence—and also upon the ability of language to
construct hierarchies, to make distinctions and value judgments between
signs and propositions (drama is the highest form of art, and so on).
And the omniscient position of the writer is a God’s-eye-view of
creation. To make judgments about propositions and their relationship
to things, in Wittgenstein’s view,
an impossibility because such
statements are outside the world, extra-logical, and therefore senseless.
Hierarchies are not possible because:
All propositions are of equal value (6.4).
The sense of the world must lie outside the world (6.41).
And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of
ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher
(6.42).
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same) (6.421).

Stephen’s art therefore bound to fail because he is asking language to
do things of which it not capable.
Another thing Stephen fails to understand (especially in the Proteus
section, quoted above) is that language is not a mere transparent series
of labels which represent the world. What language and propositions

Published by eGrove, 1988

5

Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 6 [1988], Art. 24

Robert McNutt

233

have in common is their logical form, according to Wittgenstein, but
language is no sheer “diaphane” of the world as Stephen says in
Proteus. It is more complex than that:
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the
outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the
form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of
the clothing is not designed to reveal
form of the body,
but for entirely different purposes (4.002).
At first sight a proposition—one set on the printed
page, for example—does not seem to be a picture of the
reality with which it is concerned. But no more does
musical notation at first sight seem to be a picture of
music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be
picture of our speech.
And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even
in the ordinary sense, of what they represent (4.011).

So as Ulysses opens we find Stephen in the
aesthetic quagmire
in Portrait: he cannot reconcile the things of his culture to his art, and
he fails to recognize that hierarchies of meaning are arbitrary and
things
is
ofone
artificial
order.
eless constructions
voices
In broad terms, the artistic aesthetic which Joyce assigns to
Stephen is the artistic aesthetic of the traditional novel, for the
traditional novel depends upon the construct of the authorial voice, the
voyeuristic persona outside the fictional worlds, making distinctions,
placing values upon
and viewpoints, judging his characters. For
what is a plot, after all, other than a series of “author-ized” value
judgments concerning the significance of fictional events? A narrative
line reflects the choices made by e the author, the distinctions and value
judgments placed upon things from outside the world of the book. For
to posit a particular “point of view,” or to develop a defined “character”
through the subtle use of carefully chosen detail, to create a false
objectivity, an illusion of truth, an example of Wittgenstein’s
senselessness.
Hugh Kenner, in his book Joyce’s Voices, reads Ulysses as a
conflict between two narrative
which correspond to the Homeric
voices of muse and poet,
inner and one outer:
These two narrators command different vocabularies and
proceed according to different cannons. At the outset their
command is evenly matched, and the first three Bloom
episodes, culminating in “Hades,” exhibit an economical
weaving of inner and outer, the brisk notation of Bloom’s
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thought and the wonderfully compact narration glinting one
against the other.4

But after “Hades,” Kenner says, something happens. These two
voices—the voice of lyrical subjectivity and the voice of neutral
objectivity—begin to conflict, each prone to its own excesses. The
objective, outer voice which was responsible for the headlines of
“Aeolus” also controls “Sirens,” and the subjective, inner voice shows
its excessive stylistic power in “Oxen of the Sun,” giving birth to
disembodied speech. These two voices are the catechistic questioner
answerer in “Ithaca,” and “Penelope” illustrates the triumph of the
lyrical, subjective voice—objectivity, the explicator’s fiction, is dead.
Kenner’s reading of Ulysses very close to what Wittgenstein
means when he says that:
The limits of my language mean
limits of my world
(5.6).
We cannot thing what we cannot think; so what we
cannot think we cannot say either (5.61).
This remark provide the key
the problem, how much
truth there is in solipsism (5.62).

We have already seen that to go beyond the limits of the world is to
attempt the objectivity of God’s eye, and this is as impossible for
Stephen as it is for Wittgenstein. But not for Joyce.
It is with the “objective” style of the “Ithaca” section of Ulysses
that Joyce
the notion of representation. The long encyclopedic
catalogues of detail which puzzle so many readers show us that
Stephen’s aesthetics mean nothing. The protean quality fo the visible
reveals nothing behind it, just as lists of objects reveal nothing about
what they are lists of. Frank Budgen writes that “Ithaca” is “the coldest
episode in an unemotional book. Everything is conveyed in the same
tone and tempo as if of equal importance. It is for the reader to assign
human values.”5 But this is not possible even for Budgen. The only
way he can interpret “Ithaca” to fall back on the Homeric parallels
and compare Bloom to the heroic Odysseus disposing of his suitors:
“Bloom’s victory in “Ithaca” is to all appearances complete” (Budgen,
p. 262). Victory? Hero? Budgen, like so many other critics of Joyce,
cannot resist the temptation to offer interpretations where there are
none.
The point of “Ithaca” is that Budgen’s “human values,” like
Stephen’s aesthetics, are senseless. Consider, for example, one of the
catalogues in “Ithaca,”
contents of Bloom’s secret, locked drawer:
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What did the first drawer unlocked contain?
A Vere Foster’s handwriting copybook, property of
Milly (Millicent) Bloom, certain pages of which bore
diagram drawings marked Palpi, which showed a large
globular head with five hairs erect, 2 eyes in profile, the
trunk in full front wit 3 large buttons, 1 triangular foot: 2
fading photographs of Queen Alexandra of England and of
Maude Branscombe, actress and professional beauty: a
Yuletide card, bearing on it a pictorial representation of a
parasitic plant, the legend Mizpah, the date Xmas 1892,
the names of
senders, from Mr and Mrs M. Comerford,
the versicle: May this Yuletide bring to the, Joy and peace
and welcome glee: a butt of red partly liquified sealing
wax, obtained from the stores department of Messrs Hely’s
Ltd., 89, 90, and 91 Dame Street: a box containing the
remainder of a gross of gilt ‘J’ pennibs, obtained from the
same firm; an old sandglass which rolled containing sand
which rolled . . . (Ulysses, pp. 720-721).

Here is the trivia and clutter of Bloom’s life, and they add nothing to
our understanding of Bloom. Who are the Comerfords? In his Notes
for Joyce, Don Gifford
“Mr. and Mrs. M. Comerford—lived at
Neptune View, 11 Leslie Avenue, Dalkey,” according to Thom's
Dublin Post Office Directory, 1886.6 Who is Maude Branscombe?
Again Gifford tells us that she was “an actress with an extraordinary
reputation for beauty” who sold 28,000 photographs of herself in 1885
(Gifford, p. 325). Now the careful reader also knows that Bloom, in
“Nausicca,”
pages earlier, lists Maude Branscombe in a series of
Irish actresses as he masturbates wile watching Gerty MacDowell, so
are we to make a connection? Does Bloom masturbate wit the
photograph as
Or did he just happen to keep one of those 28,000
photographs? Is Bloom “at it again” on the Christmas card too?
Perhaps, perhaps not. And this is precisely my point: these
catalogues leave us unable to sort through the details to find the
patterns of meaning, for there are none. The hierarchies of meaning are
gone. Budgen is half right: everything in “Ithaca” is of equal
importance, but there are no “human values” to assign them. And to be
sure we don’t miss the point, Joyce has Bloom give us the final
nonsensical catalogue “Ithaca” closes: “Sinbad the Sailor and Tinbad
the Tailor and Jinbad the Jailer ...” and so on to “Xinbad the
Phthailer” (Ulysses, p. 737). The catalogues themselves degenerate,
like an engine running on its last drops of gasoline, racing faster and
faster until it exhausts itself, finally falling silent. The end of “Ithaca”
was the last writing Joyce did before starting on the Wake, and in the
chronology of the actual production of Ulysses, the book ends not with
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Molly’s “yes” but rather with the big black Roc’s egg at the close of
“Ithaca.” (“Penelope,” you may remember, was finished before “Ithaca”
so the book could be reviewed.)
So as a coda to my discussion I come round at last to my subtitle:
why, in theoretical terms, I think Joyce wrote Finnegans Wake. In
1921, the year of publication of both Ulysses and the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein packed his bags and headed for the secluded Austrian
countryside to teach
grade for six years, and Joyce began work on
the Wake. The Wake, in short, with its babble of undifferentiated
voices, is Joyce’s alternative to Wittgenstein’s silence. A world
without distinctions in which all propositions are equal and therefore
useless was unbearable for Wittgenstein; Joyce embraced it with comic
celebration. Louis O. Mink, a philosopher as well as a Wake scholar,
writes:
Because Finnegans Wake is not about anything but
itself, it is, I think, the most consummately nihilistic work
in any literature. By “nihilism,” I do not mean merely an
extreme degree of skepticism, rebellion, or destructiveness,
but rather the complete absence of the capacity to order the
world by a scale of relative values, by any hierarchy of
relative importance . . .
In the world of Finnegans Wake . . . everything is of
equal value with everything else.7

It’s true. Take, for example, the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” episode from
the Wake, which nearly everyone considers to be the most intelligible
chapter, largely because Joyce himself made a recording of it. ALP, in
her role as the primary female persona of the Wake, is, through various
allusions, identified with Hero, Petrarch’s Laura, Leda, Molly Bloom,
all the whores in the world, “poor las animas” (her initials reversed),
anima—any Ma. There is no distinction; all these roles are laid side by
side, one after the other, with no historical or mythic differentiation.
The pleasure of reading the Wake, as anyone who has tried it knows, is
unraveling the puns and the allusions—but putting the individual pieces
into a coherent, “author-ized” whole is impossible.
Consider the hundreds of puns on river names which run through
the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” chapter. They are marvelous to spot and
work out, but they add nothing “deeper” to the meaning. If you happen
to know, for example, that Lough Neagh is the largest lake in the
United Kingdom (which I didn’t—I read it in a crib on the Wake), then
the line “how long was he [HCE] kept under loch and neagh” (Wake,
p. 196.20) more fun. How long was HCE under, presumably, lock
and key (for one is never sure), for his crime of voyeurism or
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exhibitionism, and how long was he under ALP, whose associations
seem to be rivers? Neither reading is primary—they both coexist side
by side.
Or if you happen to know that the Tombigbee is a river in
Alabama do—I was bom there. Joyce read this one in a crib on
Alabama.), then among the list of presents for ALP’s children the line
“and a nightmarching hare for Techertim Tombigby” (Wake, p. 210.15)
appears to make a little more sense. ALP, being associated with water,
gives birth to other rivers. But I still have no idea what a rabbit
walking in darkness has to be with Alabama, even though I spotted the
pun.
Either way, whether you spot the puns or not, it makes no
difference. The allusions and puns are self-contained, and they fit no
larger scheme of reference; they exist independently from their context.
In philosophical terms, Wittgenstein agrees: “There is no compulsion
making one thing happen because another has happened” (6.37).
Things and events can exist independently one from another without a
hierarchical system of values to relate them. “Hierarchies are and must
be independent of reality” (5.5561), writes Wittgenstein, and the method
of Finnegans Wake bears this out. The Wake is, according to
Wittgenstein’s program, a book of perfect realism.
NOTES
1 Ulysses (New York, 1961), p. 37. All references to Joyce s
works will come from this edition, and from A Portrait of the Artist
as a Young Man (New York, 1964), and Finnegans Wake (New
York, 1959).

2Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness (New York,
References will be to this edition
and will appear in the text by proposition, rather than page,
number.
3Cecil H. Brown, Wittgenstein Linguistics (The Hague,
p. 15.

4Hugh Kenner, Joyce’s Voices (Berkeley,

p. 73.

5Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses
(Bloomington, 1969),
257.

6Don Gifford, with Robert J. Seidman, Notes for Joyce (New
York, 1974), p. 487.
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